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Abstract 
The work of product designers has to evolve in phase with the improvements made to technology and changes in regulations. They 
have to work on different aspects of a product such as its technological, legal, environmental and occupational safety implications. 
European directive 2006/42/CE promulgates safe machine design principles to prevent professional risks. These principles guide 
machine designers to reduce residual risks as much as the technological state of the art permits. Special machine designers are by 
definition confronted by a lack of specific standards relating to a priori risk analysis. The aim of this paper is to present an original 
approach to help them to identify hazards upstream and also throughout the design process. 
This approach is based on the fact that hazards are linked to the presence of energies. Hazard identification can be done through 
the detection of parameters linked to energy sources and flows. The approach then feeds back information to designers about 
potential contacts between energies and workers, to highlight the need to add preventive measures. 
We use the Functional-Structural Model is used to represent the machine energy architecture through the different steps of its 
lifecycle. Thus it is possible to identify every interface through which energies circulate. These interfaces are defined by two kinds 
of parameter: energetic parameters (linked to energy properties), and other design parameters. 
This paper first presents a detailed classification of energetic parameters that are also indicators of the hazards present in the 
machine. We then present logical rules for processing these energetic parameters and others, in order to increase the accuracy of 
the hazard identification performed. To conclude, the results obtained from using this approach during the industrial design of a 
supply line is detailed to validate the pertinence of its application from the earliest design stages, with improved accuracy during 
the subsequent design stages. 
 Keywords: design; machine; working equipment; methodology; energy; hazard identification; risk; safety; worker; operator. 
1. Introduction
The work of machine designers has evolved in line with the
evolution of technologies, laws and society. They can no longer 
limit their work to the design of a solution that will only resolve 
a technological problem. Besides the latter, they have to 
simultaneously consider problems linked to financial, time-
based, environmental and safety aspects [1, 2]. 
In 2014, out of the 621 111 work accidents declared in 
France, about 8% were associated with machines, and thus 
partially with production equipment, according to French 
statistics on professional accidents. Regarding these accidents 
in particular, and more generally occupational health and 
safety, design is a path of prevention whose advantages no 
longer need demonstrating and is known as “integrated 
prevention”. This approach is codified by European directive 
2006/42/EC, known as the “Machinery” directive, and by its 
associated standards. The prevention strategy recommended in 
these texts focuses on a priori risk assessment. It gives the 
machine designer the objective of obtaining the lowest possible 
risk level according to the state of the art.  
However, except for some catalogue machinery for which 
specific standards exist (known as type “C”) and which are 
subject to this risk assessment, special equipment designers 
must rely on transversal standards (types “A” and “B”), and 
especially standard NF EN ISO 12100 related to general design 
principles.  
It is important to underline that in France, production 
equipment is mostly designed and manufactured by small and 
medium enterprises (according to the 2014 data of French 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry). Therefore, since 
designers belonging to these SMEs are not specialized in 
prevention and have no formal resources or tools adapted to 
perform a priori risk assessments, they are limited on the one 
hand to the risk families closest to their field of experience 
(e.g., mechanical) and, on the other hand, to carrying out this 
assessment at the end of the project, once all the technical 
solutions have been selected. Furthermore, the information 
required for risk assessments (severity of harm, frequency, 
exposure, probability of occurrence, possibility of avoidance) 
are not just linked to design data, thereby widening the gap 
between design and safety. Occupational health and safety 
requirements are thus treated as constraints of adaptation and 
correction instead of design.  
To solve this issue, we propose a method to assist special 
machine designers to systematically identify hazards, an 
essential step of risk assessment. To be more efficient, this 
approach must verify the four following characteristics: 
 generic:  faced with the different hazard types, the design 
process implemented and the type of machine; 
 inductive: based on the design parameters (causes) to 
identify hazards (effects) through parameters used in risk 
assessment methods (e.g., NF EN 1005 for ergonomic 
hazards or directive 2001/59/EC for chemical hazards); 
 dynamic and traceable: monitoring the evolution of system 
characteristics and the configuration of components from 
the outset and during the different design stages; 
 integration and/or compatibility with current design 
elements: ensuring interoperability and ease of use through 
monitoring and indicators in order to quantify and use data. 
2. Literature review
For the sake of this paper clarity, we define and organize the
main terms linked to design based on the literature. Thus we 
consider that a design approach is a set of design phases (e.g., 
architectural design) that structure design activities (e.g., 
drawing creation). The latter are composed of five design tasks, 
sources of design data (e.g., parameters, intermediate objects). 
The intermediate objects (IO) punctuate and link the design 
activities and guarantee the design parameters maturity [3-5]. 
2.1. Design approaches 
Different works on design have been identified in the 
literature to cover a lot of problem the designer can meet: 
design process management, decision-making, environmental 
or safety problems [2]. These works can be approaches, 
methods or tools and can cover all or a part of the design 
process [6-9]. Consequently, a wide range of elements structure 
the designer’s work. However, according to [5], design 
activities can be divided into five generic tasks: creation, 
dimensioning, representation, optimization /evaluation and 
validation. 
To maintain the generic objective toward the design process 
followed by designers, the method will therefore use these 
elementary tasks, intermediate objects [3] and the parameters 
generated from them, since they are independent from design 
approaches and activities. This point is essential as the 
enterprises targeted are mostly VSE/SMEs which do not follow 
well a formal design approach. 
2.2. Risk prevention in design  
Numerous articles on risk reduction in the design process 
were found in the literature [10, 11]. We focused this literature 
review on hazard identification since it belongs to the risk 
analysis process. 
     Research works on integrating risk analysis in production 
system design mainly focuses on two paths: the design process 
organization and risk evaluation, but in both cases these works 
present limits regarding the problematic of this paper. 
     Works that focus on the design process mostly propose 
methods that call on collaborative project reviews [12, 13]. The 
reduction of risk in general, and the identification of hazards in 
particular, are based on cooperation between the different 
actors during these project reviews. Therefore this type of 
approach does not guide the designer in decision-making when 
they work independently in front of their workstation [14]. 
Furthermore, when these project reviews are performed using 
numerical mock-ups or physical prototypes, this type of 
approach must be sufficiently advanced in the design process 
to analyze the risks [15]. 
     Regarding studies on risk assessment and evaluation [11, 
16], i.e. the determination of an index used to classify potential 
risks, they are generally specific to a single type (e.g., 
mechanical risk [17]). Moreover, these methods are focused on 
the combination of the different parameters involved in 
assessing risks. These parameters are similar from one method 
to another. As recommended by standard NF EN ISO 12100, 
these parameters include severity of harm, frequency/ duration 
of exposure, probability of occurrence of a hazardous event and 
the possibility of avoidance. The main differences between the 
proposed methods concern the number of levels used to 
evaluate these parameters and how they are combined (e.g., 
matrix, graph, numerical equation, abacus, chart). 
Consequently, these works do not provide an answer to the 
previously highlighted problem, which aims to identify 
hazards.  
     Analysis of the literature nonetheless made it possible to 
identify four approaches that a priori provide an answer to this 
paper problem and satisfy the expected criteria (generic, 
inductive, dynamic and integrated):  
 Coulibaly et al. [18] proposed a Risk Factor (FRis) 
indicating whether a risk is present or not. This paper has 
the same goal but FRis indicator requires parameters that are 
not naturally created during the design process; 
 The “PAG” multi-agent system [19] is a system to analyse 
the performance of working situations based on numerical 
mannequins. Its integration in the designer’s tools is ideal, 
but since it is based on a virtual mannequin, it intervenes too 
late in the design process. 
 The “IRAD” method [20] proposes the simultaneous 
development of technical and safety functions. It guides 
designers throughout the design process and deals with all 
kinds of hazards. However, it does not describe how 
hazardous phenomena are identified. 
 The work situation model “MOSTRA” [21] facilitates the 
inclusion of multi-viewpoint data through the notion of risk, 
but it does not define the direct link between design 
parameters and hazardous phenomena and it is a model 
without data processing. 
Through this literature analysis, we concluded that none of 
these works satisfied our need to identify hazards throughout 
the design process.   
However, some of them agreed on the hypothesis that 
hazardous phenomena are linked to energies [20, 22, 23]. On 
this basis, hazard identification can be performed through the 
identification of energy sources and flows. 
3. EZID : Energy analysis for systematic haZard
Identification during Design 
Based on this hypothesis, we propose a method to identify 
hazards by analyzing the parameters linked to energies in four 
steps: machine modelling, relevant hazard type identification, 
identification of consequences and, finally, significant hazard 
identification. 
3.1. Step 1: machine energy flows modelling 
The first step of EZID is to represent the machine through 
its energy flows. The literature includes different models that 
allow this kind of representation [24-26] and the Functional-
Structural Model (FSMo) is considered as relevant [27, 28].  
It is based on four elements (cf. Fig. 1.):  
 frontiers: delimitation of a physical element of the machine 
or the worker and their environment; 
 functional surfaces: energy exchange interfaces (contains 
the data about properties of the energies and surfaces); 
 links: association of two functional surfaces that do not 
belong to the same component (can be conductive (C), semi-
conductive (SC) or insulating (I)); 
 internal links: association of two functional surfaces 
belonging to the same component. They can also be 
conductive, semi conductive or insulating.  
The FSMo was developed to analyze the different kinds of 
energy flows in existing complex systems and then to follow 
the design process of a product from its initial structure. As it 
allows modelling workers with the same elements, it also 
provides  a  global  and  uniform  view of the  different energy  
Fig. 1. Functional-structural model (FSMo) 
flows within a man/machine system. It has already been 
subjected to computerization.  Therefore, it corresponds to the 
desired characteristics of our approach: generic, dynamic and 
compatible with current design tools and methods. 
The identification of hazard sources linked to these energy 
flows thus becomes systematic by identifying all the functional 
surfaces of the system. Finally, the designer’s goal will be to 
limit or remove the potential energy flows linked to the worker. 
The next step of EZID uses the elements and parameters 
linked to energies stored in the functional surfaces to identify 
the relevant hazard (hazard which is identified as being present 
at, or associated with, the machine according to NF EN ISO 
12100). Some of these parameters are based on generalized 
variables described in the Bond Graph model and detailed in 
the next section.  
3.2. Step 2: Relevant hazard type identification 
During the risk assessment, the energy properties are used 
to estimate the severity of harm parameter [29], confirming the 
hypothesis that hazards are linked to the presence of energies. 
Based on this, we choose to use the concept of generalized 
variables [30] to express the energy properties. It distinguishes 
energetic parameters into two categories: generalized effort 
(ge) and currents (gc). They correspond to the source and the 
flow of energy, respectively. These parameters are also linked 
to the power P through the following relation: P=f(ge, gc). 
Mechanical, electric, thermal hazards, and those linked to 
physical nuisances (noises, vibrations, radiation) can be linked 
directly to energy parameters (e.g., potential energy, kinetic 
energy, electric currents). However, the bond-graph theory 
does not cover every kind of energy and therefore not every 
kind of hazard. In addition, certain kinds of hazard do not 
estimate severity of harm through direct energy parameters. It 
was then completed with the parameters used for severity of 
harm in risk assessment. Some parameters were replaced with 
other that are more frequently used by designers based on NF 
EN ISO 12100 (mechanical), NF EN 60204 (electric), NF X35-
112 (thermal), NF EN 62471 (light radiation), NF EN 60825 
(laser), NF ISO 2631 and NF EN ISO 5349 (vibration), NF EN 
ISO 9612 (ISO 11688) (acoustic), directive 98/24/EC 
(chemical), NF EN 1005 (ergonomic) and (directives 
2004/40/EC) PR NF EN 50505 (EM fields) and 
2013/59/EURATOM (ionizing) (cf. Table 1).  
Based on these standards, workers can receive and transmit 
(voluntarily or not) energy. Consequently, a functional surface 
will always appear on each frontier to represent the 
unintentional transmission of energy from the worker to the 
machine. Another and forever present functional surface is that 
linked to weight, since every subsystem has a mass. 
Every parameter in this table is available to the designer and 
can be used during the design process. Thus they describe the 
energy flows in the FSMo. To identify the relevant hazard 
types, EZID will compare the energetic parameters defined in 
the FSMo with the reference parameters capitalized in Table 1. 
Thus the energetic parameters are the primary indicators to 
identify hazards. 
Greater precision for most hazard types is not necessary. 
However, for mechanical and chemical hazards, it is possible 
to obtain useful information on the consequences.  
Table 1. Extended generalized efforts and currents. 
Type of hazard / 
Corresponding energy 





Force (N) Velocity (m/s) 
Mechanical (rotation) / 




(pneumatic / hydraulic) 
Elastic/static energy 
Pressure (P) Flowrate (m^3/s) 
Electric/Electric Voltage (V) Intensity (A) 
Thermal/Thermal Temperature (K) Heat flow (J/s=W) 
Radiation / (electro-
magnetism) 
Electric field (V.m-1) 
Magnetic field (Tesla) 
Electric flow (V.m) 





Radiant exposure (J.m-2)  
Radiance  (W.m-2.sr-1) 
Spectral density 
(W.m-1) 
Radiation / (laser) Wavelength (m) 
Laser class 
Radiation / (ionizing) 
Dose (Sv)  
Dose-per-unit  
intake (Sv.Bq-1) 
Vibration / Vibration Acceleration (m.s-2) Exposure time (s) 
Acoustic / Acoustic Noise level (dB(A)) Exposure time (s) 
Chemical / Chemical - 
biological 
Level of threat 
Concentration (mol.L-1) Exposure time (s) 
Ergonomic / Worker Effort (N) Velocity (m/s) / 
Action frequency 
3.3. Step 3: Consequences identification 
A consequence is a description of the damage caused by a 
hazard. For example, mechanical hazards can cause a wide 
range of damage as mentioned in NF EN ISO 12100, such as 
piercing, impact or severing, and chemical hazards can create 
various types of damage linked to the risk phrases of the 
products identified in directive 2001/59/EC.  
For the designer, it is important to know these consequences 
in order to select specific preventive measures for the damage 
and integrate them in the design instead of selecting 
maladjusted generic measures. 
These consequences are created by combining the energetic 
parameters of Table 1 and complementary parameters that 
describe the functional surface characteristics such as position 
(e.g., relative position between two parts, trajectory), geometric 
(e.g., dimensions, edge, surface state) and intrinsic (e.g., 
material state) parameters. 
 We use the root-cause analysis (cf. Fig. 2.) for each hazard 
types to identify the corresponding energetic and 
complementary parameters, and the combinations that lead to 
its consequences [29]. By observing the appearance of these 
complementary parameters, it is possible to know if damage 
exists or is in the process of occurring.  
 At this stage, designers know the relevant hazards in detail, but 
they do not know if they will lead to any risks. It is necessary 
to improve the results of the identification to obtain feedback 
on the significant hazards (hazard which has been identified as 
relevant and which requires specific action by the designer to 
eliminate or to mitigate the risk according to the risk 
assessment according to NF EN ISO 12100) [31-35]. 
3.4. Step 4: Significant hazards identification 
Some energetic parameters must be subject to legal 
threshold values to protect users from harm. For example, it is 
forbidden to let a worker handle a mass over 25kg often without 
equipment to assist them [36]. To complete the identification, 
EZID uses the threshold values defined in standards and 
directives to characterize significant hazards. 
Since Table 1 is based on the energetic parameters already 
included in risk estimation methods, all the legal threshold 
values (when they exist) are linked to them. Some of these 
values are absolute (e.g., chemical occupational exposure limit 
values) [37] and others depend on design parameters such as 
material characteristics for thermal hazards according to NF EN 
ISO 13732.  
To verify if a relevant hazard is significant, the method 
compares the values of the energetic parameters present in the 
machine with the threshold values. When they do not exist, the 
hazard is directly considered as significant. 
So far, EZID performed a complete identification of the 
hazards in the machine, and differentiated those that are certain 
to represent risks from the others. The data fed back to designer 
must contain the localization of significant hazards (functional 
surfaces), their types and the damage if possible. Relevant 
hazards do not have to be fed back but they must be capitalized 
and updated if their corresponding energetic or complementary 
parameters are modified. 
With the feedback on significant hazards, designers can 
continue the risk analysis process to obtain both risk 
assessment and evaluation. Once obtained, they have to choose 
the risk prevention/reduction solutions to be applied. If these 
solutions add new parts in the machine or replace some in the 
current design, it is necessary to update the FSMo and repeat 
the analysis so as to identify the consequences of such 
modifications. 
EZID must be used until all the significant hazards are 
prevented and the machine is made as safe as possible. 
Fig. 2. Extract of logical rules to create a “drawing in” consequence of a 
mechanical hazard 
4. Case study
4.1. Case and documents 
To confront EZID with industrial reality, we studied the 
design of a supply line (structure, conveyors, actuator, metal 
gutter, photocells and trash box) with a shape recognition 
module (camera + controlled light) and a common area with a 
robot (cf. Fig. 3.). It was monitored from its requirements 
specification to the first prototype. 
The intermediate elements of the industrial case provided 
were the requirements specification drafted by the customer, 
the 3D CAO models of the supply line with the bill of materials, 
and the reports on the prototype tests. 
4.2. EZID application 
4.2.1. Model 
EZID was applied for each intermediate object. First, it has 
represented the machine in FSMo language. For the 
requirements specification, the machine was considered as a 
whole with a single frontier that exchanges energies with 
external parts. The FSMo was more complete for the CAD 
model and the prototype, with all the subsystems and parts.  
4.2.2. Relevant hazard kind identification 
 As stated at the end of § 3.1, the identification of relevant 
hazards entails identifying the functional surfaces of each 
FSMo. As described in Table 2, 77 relevant hazards were 
identified in the requirements specification, 358 in the 3D CAD 
model and 445 in the final prototype. The identification of their 
type was done by comparing the energetic parameters with 
those in Table 1. These results cover the use, maintenance, 
assembly/ disassembly and transport lifecycle steps.   
Mechanical hazards are linked to the shape/geometry, mass 
and movements of parts and the entire machine. The noise 
hazards are caused by the moving subsystems and the falling 
of metallic parts on the metal gutter. Radiation hazards are 
linked to the controlled light from the shape recognition 
module and photocells. Thermal and vibration hazards are 
caused by the motors and the actuator.  
It is important to highlight the fact that hazards can be 
identified from the requirements specification. It is also 
important to note that the majority of hazards are not removed 
from the machine between the CAD model and the prototype.  
It was also observed that the main solution for risk reduction 
was not to suppress them but to add safeguards. 
Figure 3. Simplified model of the supply line 
Table 2. Results of the relevant hazards identification 
Hazard kind Requirements  CAD model  Prototype 
Mechanical 71 256 314 
Electric 0 18 18 
Thermal 0 6 6 
Noise 0 7 7 
Vibration 0 6 6 
Radiation 1 11 11 
Ergonomic 5 61 90 
4.2.3. Consequences identification 
Due to the parameters needed, consequences can only be 
identified from the CAD model. Mechanical hazards were 
identified so EZID could feedback data about the consequences 
they caused. Most of them caused impacts (e.g., blunt shapes 
parts) or cutting (e.g., guide rails) damage due to their 
geometries and the unwanted energy provided by the worker or 
the accumulation of gravity potential energy during 
movements. The actuator and the roller-conveyor belt could 
draw-in or crush the worker. During their handling or use, 
impact damage could be worsen by crushing between two parts 
or between a part and the ground.  
4.2.4. Significant hazard identification 
Through the comparison between energetic parameter 
values and threshold values, most of the relevant hazards did 
not become significant. Radiation, vibration, thermal, some 
noise and electric hazards were below threshold values and 
therefore did not create risks. This was guaranteed by the 
compliance of the commercial subsystems with the regulations. 
Mechanical hazards did not have threshold values and 
remaining ergonomic hazards were linked to the assembly 
phase for which data about assisting tools were lacking. 
The number of significant mechanical hazards was the same 
between the CAD model and the prototype (cf. Table 3).  
Table 3. Results of the significant hazard identification 
Hazard kind Requirements  CAD model Prototype 
Mechanical 71 24 24 
Noise 0 7 7 
Ergonomic 5 17 47 
The analysis of the CAD model shows that the designer had 
already introduced safety measures to reduce the number of 
hazards. For example, access to the common area with the robot 
was restricted by safeguards and access to the transition area 
between two conveyors was also blocked by a safeguard.  
Considering all these measures, the numbers of significant 
hazards was reduced once more. However, the number of 
ergonomic hazards increased because new parts were added to 
the machine. There were no more electric hazards since the 
components providing electricity meet current regulations. 
There were still 24 mechanical hazards linked to the mass of 
the parts and the lack of assembly data. However, there was 
still no valid solution for reducing noise from the CAD model. 
With this feedback, the designer can continue the risk 
analysis process and then define preventive measures for the 
remaining hazards. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper aims to present the EZID method that is based on 
the energy flows analysis to systematically help machine 
designer for the hazards identification during the design 
process. To do so, it uses the design parameters extracted from 
the intermediate objects. 
To confirm its usability, EZID was applied manually with 
graphs and spreadsheets on an industrial case. Its application 
returns results about the hazards characteristics since the first 
design steps, and about their evolution throughout the rest of 
the design process. It also demonstrates its capability to 
identify every kind of hazards. Thus, it allows machine 
designers to suppress or treat them from the moment they are 
identified and no longer only at the end of the design process. 
An improvement would be to incorporate the identification 
of combined hazards to return a complete feedback. Another 
one would be to include in EZID the different risk analysis 
methods to cover the whole risk analysis process.  
In conclusion, the energy analysis to identify hazards is 
relevant and usable during the design process for all kind of 
machinery. To return an exhaustive feedback, EZID must be 
applied to all the machine lifecycle steps since the energies and 
the potential interactions between the machine and the 
operators are not the same. A software is currently developed 
to provide to machine designers a fully functional method. 
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